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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
JAMES GOOLD CUTLER LECTURE 
By LINDSAY ROGERS 
I 
Delivered at the College oj William and Mary, February 8, 19# 
The architectonic principle of government under the 
American Republic is that constitutionality is placed 
above every other earthly consideration. Amendment, 
judicial decision and custom have interpreted and 
changed the last will and testament of the Founding 
F.a~hers, but we are still bound by its explicit pro-
VlSlOns. 
To an Englishman it is almost incredible that the 
United States must embark on the disguised civil war 
of a presidential election at a time when the war 
against National Socialism may be at its most critical 
stage. "Why don't you postpone the election?", says 
the Englishman. You reply that the Constitution 
requires the election to be held. "Why don't you 
amend the Constitution, and have your election when 
the war is won?", asks the Englishman. You answer 
that the procedure is too tedious and cumbersome to 
work effectively before the date of the election and 
that anyway the amendment probably would not 
carry. Its real purpose, opponents would charge, was 
to continue in office the present President and Com-
mander-in-chief, and that the avoidance of an election 
in war time was only a pretense. 
As the tide of governmental activity ebbs and flows 
and as each decade, almost each year, brings problems 
that suddenly seem acute, particular paragraphs of 
the last will and testament of the Founding Fathers 
{3} 
wax and wane in their importance. Blood shed in 
the War between the States wiped out the constitu-
tional ambiguity over slavery. The inability of the 
national government to levy income taxes without 
apportioning them among the States missed being 
catastrophic only because a constitutional amendment 
came into effect not too long before the country entered 
its first World War. Only recently have judicial 
decisions done much (but not enough) in clearing up 
the debris and waste which resulted from the immunity 
of State instrumentalities from federal taxation and 
the reciprocal relief of federal instrumentalities from 
the impact of State taxation. 
A decade ago there were grave doubts first, as to 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent 
the States from protecting their working populations, 
and, secondly, whether Congress was doomed to stand 
by idly while the economic life of the country slowly 
ebbed. In the first case those doubts were resolved, 
so far as minimum wage legislation was concerned, 
by the Supreme Court of the United States changing 
its mind, or rather by one judge changing his mind. 
As my friend, Thomas Reed Powell, put it: "A switch 
in time saved nine". On the second point the doubts 
were resolved not only by a change of mind but by 
a change in the Court. 
Happily the provisions of the last will and testament 
of the Founding Fathers have never been unduly 
limiting in respect of the exercise of the war power. 
Constitutional pedants have sometimes viewed with 
alarm and there were grave discussions concerning 
unconstitutionality during the War between the States. 
But in 1861 and 1917 national power was not ham-
strung, and in this conflict, whatever weakness and 
indecision may be charged to its conduct have come 
from human frailties and are not compelled by any 
language of the Founding Fathers. The exchange 
of destroyers for naval and air bases, Lend-Lease, 
priorities, price controls, rationing-there is a plenti-
tude of power and its use can be prompt. 
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In respect of the manner in which we conduct our 
foreign relations, however, the situation is vastly 
different. The formulation and execution of policies 
which seek to preserve and organize peace, and which 
if unsuccessful require, in Clausewitz' phrase, "another 
means" to carry them out, are under a dark shadow 
cast by the testamentary provisions of the Founding 
Fathers. If they remain there the United States, 
after emerging victorious from a second World War, 
will again be defeated by the peace. That it is not 
only unwise but unnecessary for our foreign relations 
to be hampered by the Constitution is the thesis I 
offer you today. 
I. 
When, after the first W orld War ended a quarter of 
a century ago, we had difficulties in making peace, 
our constitutional arrangements for the control of 
foreign affairs were vehemently discussed and their 
wisdom seriously questioned. N ow, while the second 
W orld War is still in progress, they are again being 
discussed and only a tiny minority in the country 
dares to deny a change would be desirable. As I shall 
argue with you, change is possible by custom. Indeed, 
some change has already come about. But I shall 
also argue, in Edmund Burke's phrase, that the laws 
reach but a little way. "Constitute government how 
you please," Burke declared, "infinitely more will 
depend on the wisdom and discretion of those who 
have it in charge." Political courage, political morality, 
accommodations between the executive and the legis-
lature within the wide ambit which the constitutional 
texts allow for rashness and discretion-these matters 
may prove as fateful to the future welfare of the 
country as the constitutional requirement that the 
President "shall have the power by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties 
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur". 
Political intelligence and courage in high places is 
something we can only hope for and seek to deserve. 
{5} 
But the constitutional provision that one more than 
one-third of the Senate can veto treaties, that, as John 
Hay put it, "for all time the kickers should rule", is a 
matter we can do something about. 
And we must do it if we are not to lose the peace. 
Happily there seems to be an increasing awareness of 
this truth. During recent weeks there has beell a 
good deal of discussion of the behavior of the Senate 
when it was dealing with the Treaty of Versailles. A 
distinguished Senator warns against "another kiss of 
death" and maintains that the oscula tory preparations 
are already under way. This is not the place to rehash 
old controversies. It is sufficient to say that in 1919-
1920 all the fault was not on one side. Proper com-
promises by President Wilson would have taken the 
United States into the League of Nations and launched 
a foreign policy that might have been tolerable in 
respect of the problems of the post-war world. Whether 
the succeeding Republican administration, which was 
so shy of the League of Nations that it refused to 
acknowledge communications from the Secretary-Gen-
eral, would have cooled on that policy and abandoned 
it speedily can only be a matter of conjecture. 
The plain fact is-and no one can deny it-that, 
in Mr. Wilson's phrase, used in 1917 when the Senate 
was considering legislation, "a little group of wilful 
men"-that is, Senators-can make the great Govern-
ment of the United States helpless and contemptible. 
In 1917 the little group did it by filibustering against 
the Armed Ship Bill. One more than one-third of the 
Senate can do it in respect of any treaty, and there 
are few save Senators who would raise their voices to 
say that such an arrangement is tolerable. To friendly 
foreign governments with which we negotiate, the 
arrangement seems intolerable. An English writer 
uses the sport of kings to illustrate the American 
position. "The President of the United States", he 
says, "is in the position of a trainer who (to the distress 
of the Jockey Club) is allowed to enter his horse 
'America' for the classic races. But only the owner 
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· 'We the people of the United States' has the power 
to put up the stake money without which, in this drab 
world, entries are not finally accepted. For example, 
every American President since Wilson's time has 
entered 'America' for the World Court. And each 
time the owners, represented by their chosen trustees, 
the Senate, have cancelled the entry. There is no 
evidence that the owners have become more ready to 
put up the stake money than they were in 1920 or 
anytime down to 1939."1 
II. 
The history of the treaty provision in the Philadel-
phia Convention has been dealt with in many authori-
tative volumes. I have myself dealt with it in a book 
which was rather called "provocative" 2. But here it 
is worth while to make a brief reference to that history. 
As is well known, the framers were all nervous of 
unrestrained authority, whether it was possessed by 
an executive or a legislature. With the exception of a 
small minority, in which Alexander Hamilton was 
most conspicuous, the men in the Philadelphia Con-
vention desired to get away from a strong government 
and by checks and balances to a void tyranny by any 
branch of the political establishment or even by a 
majority of the people acting through their elected 
representatives. That system of checks pervades the 
whole constitution and is carried so far that practically 
but one power is conferred without a corresponding 
restraint on its exercise. This is the power of executive 
clemency and for misusing it, the President would be 
accountable to the Senate in an impeachment pro-
ceeding. 
One of the early drafts of the Constitution provided 
that "the Senate of the United States shall have the 
power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors 
and judges of the Supreme Court". This was objected 
1 D. W. Brogan: "British and American Foreign Policy", Nineteenth 
Century, January 1943. 
2 "The American Senate" (1926). 
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to by Madison on the ground "that the Senate rep- . 
resented the States alone and that for this, as well as 
other obvious reasons, it was proper that the Preside+it 
should be an agent in treaties". There were, however, 
certain causes which operated to incline the Convention 
to favor dual control of foreign relations. Hamilton 
apart, the framers desired to get away from the English 
precedent of treaty negotiation by ministers and ratifi-
cation by the Crown. They feared possible autocracy 
in case the function was given to one man. It was 
suggested that since other clauses in the Constitution 
prohibited the States from making individual treaties 
they should be compensated for this loss through power 
being given. to the representatives of the States in the 
upper house; they would thus be safeguarded against 
injury by federal treaty action. Finally, under the 
Articles of Confederation, the power of entering into 
treaties and alliances had been v~sted in "the United 
States in Congress assembled" and nine- that is, two-
thirds-of the thirteen States voting as units in Con-
gress had to assent to any commitments. Congress 
had been so determined to keep foreign matters in its 
own hands that when a Foreign Secretary was ap-
pointed in 1782 he was instructed by a resolution to 
submit to Congress for its inspection and approval all 
letters to Ministers of Foreign Affairs relating to 
treaties and the plans of treaties themselves. That 
this was clumsy machinery could not be denied, but 
clumsy machinery the weaknesses of which are known 
-in 1782 or a century and a half later- sometimes 
seems more desirable than a nicely balanced machinery · 
that may run too rapidly. In any event some arrange-
ment midway between that of the Crown and that of 
the Thirteen Colonies seemed to be indicated. 
A fortnight before the Convention adjourned a new 
draft of the treaty-making clause joined the President 
with the Senate. To the proposal that ratification by 
the House of Representatives should be necessary also 
it was answered that general legislative approval would 
frustrate the desire for secrecy. If it were to be the 
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Senate alone, there should be a two-thirds vote. Hence, 
when the Committee on Style reported only three 
days before the adjournment of the Convention, the 
language of the constitutional provision which we now 
have appeared for the first time. The clause was the 
result of a compromise. Had the Convention remained 
in session longer there might have been a change. 
But the more prolonged the session the more the , 
opportunity for criticism in the country. Moreover, 
the weather in Philadelphia was quite warm. The 
delegates were exhausted. They wished to conclude 
their labors quickly. Not independent of accidental 
causes, therefore, was the emergence of the provision 
now in the Constitution. Thus the tergiversations in 
the Convention sh'ould serve to remind us that there 
is nothing particularly sacred about this clause of the 
Constitution. It is a child of chance rather than of 
logic or experience. 
The difficulty now is that the advice and consent 
of the Senate are looked upon not as a check but as 
inviting the substitution of senatorial judgment for 
executive judgment. The Senate can and does dictate 
to the President. "One more than one-third of our 
number", its ultimatum reads, "will defeat the treaty 
in its present form but we will approve the treaty if 
changes are made in certain particulars which we 
specify. Our judgment is better than yours. Public 
opinion will not be able to touch us until it has forgotten 
or is distracted by other issues. We care nothing about 
delays or embarrassments vis-a.-vis other nations, so 
you had better agree to accept the only conditions on 
which our minority will not exercise its constitutional 
veto." 
A legislative chamber may of course present a similar 
ultimatum on pending bills but it is proper that 
statutes should emerge from the conflict and reconcilia-
tion of different views, and that minorities should 
receive some concessions. Mutilation of a bill is 
rarely so important or so final as mutilation of a treaty, 
and there is no foreign contracting party to consider. 
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Furthermore, on legislation there is no constitutionally 
protected veto by one more than one-third. Perhaps 
it is not true, as John Hay maintained, that "there 
will always be 34 per cent. of the Senate on the black-
guard side of every question that comes before them". 
But there will always be Senators who insist on their 
individual prejudices or who espouse sectional or racial 
interests. Not a few Senators are profoundly con-
vinced that their wisdom is greater than that of the 
Executive. Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, proclaimed to the 
country that through his own sources of information 
which he thought were better than the sources avail-
able to the Executive, he had been assured that there 
would be no European war. Moreover, with the 
backscratching and capricious accommodation which 
flourish in every assembly not subject to responsible 
party leadership, it is easy to create a minority larger 
than 34 per cent. and to propose the substitutiop. 
of its program for the program submitted by the 
Executive. 
"There are only two things wrong with Henry Cabot 
Lodge", wrote Henry Adams. "One is that he is a 
Senator. The second is that he is a Senator from 
Massachusetts." This is a political imponderable 
which cannot be weighed but only pondered. There 
are ninety-six Senators. The amour propre attaching 
to membership in that august body seems considerably 
greater-certainly its manifestations are more obvious 
and objectionable-than the amour propre attaching 
to membership in a chamber composed of 435. It 
would probably be incorrect to argue that a larger 
percentage of Senators than of Representatives hold 
queer opinions or are demagogues or crackpots. But 
because there is unlimited debate in the Senate, because 
the newspapers think that the views of one of ninety-
six are more important than the views of one of four 
hundred and thirty-five, the country becomes much 
more aware of the mental eccentricities of certain 
Senators than of the eccentricities of their counter-
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parts in the House of Representatives. In Great 
Britain rules of procedure in the House of Commons, 
the relative unimportance of the private, dissident 
member, and the shortage of newsprint combine to 
make demagogues blush unseen. Who will deny that 
this is an advantage? 
Psychologically also the constitutional provision Ithat 
action may be prevented by one more than one-third 
of a body is an invitation to individuals to make up a 
large enough minority to interpose their veto. How, 
save on grounds such as these, is it possible to explain 
the refusal of the Senate to consider the protocol estab-
lishing the Permanent Court of International Justice 
when the House of Representatives was voting over-
whelmingly-303 to 28-in favor of adherence and 
asserting its readiness "to participate in the enactment 
of such legislation as will necessarily follow such 
approval"? Even if the majority be viewed as some-
what swollen because the House had no direct respon-
sibility and was taking a hortatory rather than a 
decisive action, it surely represented a willingness in 
the country for the Senate to act favorably. Yet for 
ten years after that vote in the House the Senate 
refused to act and when the test finally came, more 
than the one-third minority was in being. 
How account for the fact that the Fulbright resolu-
tion passed the House of Representatives by 360 to 29; 
that the Senate hemmed and hawed for six months; 
and that only the tremendous popular acclaim which 
was given the Moscow Agreement sufficed to rouse 
the upper chamber from its lethargy, or, more accu-
rately, to make it abandon its antOagonism and finical 
concern with its own constitutional prerogatives? That 
a resolution which admitted that the country is part 
of the world was finally passed is encouraging, but 
I find myself unable to agree with those who think 
that this is a cause for rejoicing. The resolution is in 
such broad terms that one could vote for it and then 
could find good and sufficient reasons to oppose any 
specific scheme for implementation. If, after months 
~ 
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of consideration, the impact of an unexpected world 
event was necessary to force the Senate to give approval 
to a measure which is in such vague terms as to be 
almost platitudinous, how can one be sanguine of 
Senate behavior when the question is that of cleaning 
up the mess that this war will leave in its wake? During 
the debate on the Treaty of Versailles, Senator John 
Sharp Williams said that the Senate would not vote 
approval of the Ten Commandments or the Lord's 
Prayer without insisting on reservations. I suppose 
that if the Senate recited "Now I lay me down to 
sleep", someone would insist on adding "and other 
appropriate forms of repose". 
III. 
How far the framers intended the Senate to be a 
privy council charged with foreign affairs is not clear. 
Certainly they thought that the Senate-then quite a 
small body-would consult with the President fre-
quently. Washington did consult but his experience 
was such that future collaboration was not attempted. 
The accident of an early incident determined the 
development of a constitutional practice which has 
been just as important as constitutional language. 
In his memoirs John Quincy Adams gives a much-
quoted account of President Washington's having 
gone to the Senate with a project of a treaty, and of 
having been present while the Senators deliberated 
upon it. "They debated it", wrote Adams, "and pro-
posed alterations so that when Washington left the 
Senate Chamber he said he would be damned if he 
ever went there again", and ever since that time treaties 
have been negotiated by the Executive without sub-
mitting them to the consideration of the Senate. Only 
on rare occasions since have there been consultations. 
In 1830 Jackson asked the Senate for its advice on a 
proposed Indian Treaty, "fully aware that in thus 
resorting to the early practice of this government by 
asking the previous advice of the Senate in the dis-
t 12} 
charge of this portion of my duties I am departing 
from a long and for many years unbroken usage in 
similar cases". Sixteen years later President Polk, 
in his message on the Oregon Boundary settlement, 
said that "this practice, though rarely resorted to in 
latter times was, in my judgment, eminently wise and 
may, on occasions of great importance, be properly 
revived". If the President is wise, as Lord Bryce 
remarked, "he feels the pulse of tlie Senate which, like 
other assemblies, has a collective self-esteem". But 
the growing size of the Senate made it inevitable that 
formal consultation would be rare. The rules still 
provide for executive sessions with the President, but 
in 1906 Senator Lodge said that if a request of that 
sort were made by the President it would be resented. 
Until the debate on the Treaty of Versailles, how-
ever, the Senate held executive sessions when it con-
sidered relations with foreign powers. In 1919, there 
was unlimited debate on the peace treaties and the 
Covenant. The Senate was a legislative chamber, 
amending and reserving. It is not desired "at this 
particular moment to afford opportunity for intem-
perate and trouble-making debate on the floor of the 
Senate. It is known to all well-informed men that the 
utmost freedom of debate is permitted under the 
Senate rules. It is further known that Senators do 
not hesitate to avail themselves of that unlimited 
freedom. International relations are delicate and 
sensitive. Unity and harmony require consultation 
and co-operation". ' Thus Senator Connally when, for 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he ex-
plained the reasons for not reporting the Fulbright 
Resolution. l 
Secretaries of State consult with the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations but not as much as they 
should. The ease with which in 1913 Secretary of 
State Bryan's conciliation treaties were accepted was 
due to the fact that the then Great Commoner had 
discussed them with the Senate Committee. Recently 
1 New York Times, September 25, 1943. 
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there have been promising contracts between certain 
Senators and the State Department for the considera-
tion of post-war policies, but a good deal more could 
be done. The British House of Commons, which is 
not organized in committees, does have an informal 
group of members who are specially interested in 
international questions. The Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs occa~ionally appears before this group 
and discusses matters with them more frankly than 
he could in the House. The advice and criticism he 
may get are helpful, and members of the group, made 
more au courant with developing policies, are likely 
to be better informed and more sympathetic supporters 
of the Secretary of State when matters become before 
the House for discussion. Secretary Hull's appearance 
before Congress to report on the Moscow agreements 
was all to the good even though, unlike Mr. Eden in 
the House of Commons, Mr. Hull simply made a 
pronouncement and did not participate in any debate. 
The more the State Department abandons its aloofness 
from Congress and its members the more likely a 
sympathetic understanding of its policies2 
IV. 
The one more than one-third of the Senate could be 
made up of Senators from the seventeen smallest States 
which contain not more than one-twelfth of the people 
of the country. It may be said that such a calculation 
is fanciful, and it probaply is. But the elected rep-
resentatives of the people of the United States number 
531, and I submit that there is no reason in allowing 
33-less than 7 per cent. of them-to determine the 
foreign policy of the United States. It should in 
2 See the correspondence between Secretary Hull and Senator Wiley over 
the latter's proposal to set up a Foreign Relations Advisory Council composed 
of high officials of the State Department and of representatives of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. Congressional Record, November 25, 1942. 
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frankness be added that the 7 per cent "might protect" 
the more populous States of the country nine of which 
contain a majority of the population. The Senators 
from these nine States plus sixteen other Senators 
could defeat a combination of the thirty-one smallest 
States. But such alignments have never taken place 
and it is inconceivable that they oould in the field of 
foreign policy. Section versus section (New York 
and Delaware; California and Nevada); farmer versus 
labor; wealth versus poverty-alignments could and 
will be on these lines but happily not on bigness versus 
smallness. Happily also our racial stocks are not 
thus distributed over the country. Nor is the argu-
ment against the two-thirds rule affected by the fact 
that 24 States with 23 millions would have the same 
voting power as 24 States with 108 millions population. 
Who is alarmed by that in respect of legislation? 
It should be . remembered that, when the present 
constitutional arrangement was accepted, the conduct 
of foreign relations was much more the peculiar 
province of kings than it now is. This is not the 
place to argu~ whether, as diplomacy has become 
democratized, it has become more successful, or to 
consider the merit or the demerit of the second part 
of the first of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points: "open 
covenants of peace, openly arrived at". The first 
part is unchallenged. No non-totalitarian govern-
ment today, with responsible political leaders, would 
propose that that government accept international 
commitments without the nature of the commitments 
being known in advance, discussed by the public and 
approved by .elected representatives of the people-
tacitly, as is the case with the British Parliament, or 
explicitly in other countries by some legislative ratify-
ing authority. If, as Walter Bagehot said seventy-five 
years ago, legislation of exceedingly minor importance 
is debated clause by clause and must run the gamut of 
parliamentary approval" there is no reason why a 
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treaty which may commit the lives and fortunes of 
millions of citizens should not run a similar gamut of 
criticism and be submitted for approval by a repre-
sentative assembly. 
Indeed, it may be argued that our present machinery 
for advising and consenting to the ratification of 
treaties is obsolete and undemocratic not only because 
a minority of the Senate can interpose a veto but 
because two-thirds of the Senate are not sufficiently 
representative to put the kind of imprimatur of 
approval that there should be on an international 
engagement. A foreign policy would have much more 
moral backing if, as a policy, it had to be supported 
by the House of Representatives as well as by the 
Senate in order to be binding. Such support must 
come later when the House passes appropriations or 
implementing legislation. In effect, then, the House 
has a veto which it does not exercise. 
In so far as the content of foreign policy is con-
cerned, the House of Representatives has a greater 
interest than it had when international questions were 
predominantly politicaL Domestic problems and inter-
national relations are far more closely intertwined 
than they used to be. A Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act 
sets up a series of tariff retaliations in Europe which 
lead to economic misery-the well-watered soil in 
which the seeds of dictatorship blossom and burgeon 
rapidly. A policy of reflation-as was Mr. Roosevelt's 
policy in 1933-torpedoes the World Economic Con-
ference in London and has far-reaching international 
complications. The question of whether we retain in 
operation the synthetic rubber plants which have 
been built in this war will determine the prosperity or 
the penury of native populations in the Pacific Islands 
and in -South American states. Foreign offices, even 
though reluctantly, have come to recognize that the 
emissaries that they send abroad must be more than 
diplomats: they must know something of business 
and economic organization. They must not be per-
mitted to become aloof from currents of opinion 
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and from emerging domestic problems in their own 
countries. Hence both the British Foreign Office 
and the State Department are paying attention to 
the problem of recruiting men for the foreign service 
whose training will cover much more than diplomatic 
history, diplomatic forms, international law-in short, 
what one of the writers on diplomacy called the art of 
negotiation with princes. Pending the recruitment of 
such a type of public servant, every Embassy now 
has economic experts, commercial counsellors, labor 
advisers, press and radio officers whose jobs are more 
important than the jobs of the military, naval and 
air attaches. 
When war came foreign offices and embassies were 
not so staffed. Hence a plethora of special agencies 
which performed special tasks in respect of interna-
tional relations: economic warfare and foreign propa-
ganda. In the United States there was quarrelling 
over who was to do what. Economic warfare was at 
first a kind of step-child of the army and then under a 
Board headed by Vice-President Wallace. A violent 
quarrel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
which was itself waging economic battles for raw mate-
rials, resulted in all such activities, theoretically at 
least, going under the control of the State Department. 
But then in September last this new organization, the 
competing show which the State Department had been 
running, and Lend-Lease, which had been and still 
was separate, were thrown together into a Foreign 
Economic Administration not formally under the Sec-
retary of State but with great powers that must be 
"exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of 
the United States as defined by the Secretary of 
State". Meanwhile, the internal fermentation in the 
State Department had been incessant. A mere enumer-
ation of the many shifts, which I list in an appendix, 
will show vividly how the task of diplomacy has been 
transformed. Once diplomats had to court monarchs 
and curry favor with royal mistresses. Then it was 
important that they interpret the views of and get 
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along well with "the governing classes"l. Their popu-
larity with the peoples of the governments to which 
they are accredited must now be taken into account. 
But above all, ambassadors must now administer 
swollen chancelleries and large staffs of their own. 
They must also keep in touch with and seek to coordi-
nate the activities of a host of officials from different 
national departments or agencies-commerce, agri-
culture, labor, information, propaganda-who are seek-
ing to carry out what is the supposed foreign policy of 
their country. Great Britain has attempted an ad hoc 
solution of the problem in the Middle East and Wash-
ington by appointing emissaries of cabinet rank. When 
this war began foreign offices thought their cavalry 
was still all important. The bombers and the tanks 
were manufactured in other branches of the govern-
ment. Now foreign offices properly seek to take over 
the direction of the new arms. 
In short, modern diplomacy is the business of the 
executive and the representatives of the people in a 
sense that it has never been before. Under American 
constitutional law, as I have said, treaties are not self-
executing but always require legislation to implement 
them. Money must be provided and that can be 
forthcoming only by an appropriation approved by 
Congress. The size of the army and navy and air 
force and the wealth or penury of those forces in 
weapons are determined by Congress. Why, then, 
should it be thought that an international engagement 
from which important domestic and fiscal consequences 
will flow has enough general backing if it is approved 
only by two-thirds of the Senators of the United States? 
Why should the liquidation of lend-lease, arrange-
1 Since the war began Atticus, a well-known Englishman who contributes a 
column to the London Sunday Times, wrote as follows concerning the appoint-
ment of a new British Ambassador to Brazil. It was, he said, "swift pro-
motion for a man who, three years ago, was counsellor at our Embassy in 
Rome. Sir ---, who will be fifty this year, played golf with Ciano, was 
faultlessly correct with the Germans, and did his best to keep Mussolini sane. 
With his excellent wardrobe, his epicurean taste as a host, his good-humoured 
imperturbability, and his attractive wife, he will make friends quickly in 
Rio de Janeiro". 
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ments for currency stabilization, the provision of inter-
national development funds, the disposition of excess 
merchant shipping, and agreement on air routes be 
subject to veto by one more than one-third of the 
Senate, or approved without the consent of the House 
of Representatives? If Congress must declare war, 
why should the treaty-making machinery be allowed 
to make peace? These questions have become familiar 
ones and there is now a growing body of opinion which 
is eager to put the two-thirds vote on the shelf and 
to see international engagements approved by a major-
ity vote in both branches of Congress precisely like 
domestic legislation. 
This, of course, would strengthen the position of the 
President. He would have a much easier time getting 
a majority of Congress to follow the course which he 
had charted on what he conceived to be the interests 
of the country than he has had in the past or than he 
would have in the future of getting two-thirds of the 
Senate. But though he would have an easier time he 
would have a great many difficulties. 
Opinion in the House of Representatives is just as 
accurate a reflection of opinion in the country as a 
whole as is the opinion of the Senate. Indeed there 
are sound reasons for assuming that the House is a 
better mirror-that it may sometimes be too good a 
mirror when, in yielding to pressure groups, Represen-
tatives think more of re-election at the end of their 
two-year term than they do of serving the interests of 
their country. It is then that the House becomes too 
much like a Congress of Ambassadors which does not 
deliberate and agree but follows instructions. Senators, _ 
secure for a six-year term, can afford to be more 
independent of such pressures. They can also be much 
more individualistic. 
Because of the shorter term, because of the size of 
the body, because no publicist has ever thought it 
pertinent to say of a Representative, "I have two 
faults to find with him: he is a Representative and he 
is a Representative from a particular state", the House 
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of Representatives would be a more cooperative partner 
in the conduct of foreign relations that the Senate has 
proved to be. But even when the President deals 
with Congress as a whole, he still has difficulties. He 
is unable to crack the whip of party discipline. Mr. 
Chamberlain, to be sure, cracked that whip too effec-
tively when he threw Mr. Eden overboard from his 
Cabinet and when he flew to Munich.1 But few in the 
United States would deny that presidential inability to 
use the whip at all handicaps him severely in all his 
dealings with Congress and permits his leadership in 
foreign policy to be flouted with impunity. There is in 
the United States an institutional encouragement of 
legislative antagonism to the President instead of insti-
tutional encouragement to cooperation. Sectional or 
racial pressure which in England is effectively chan-
nelled through the conduit of recognized executive 
leadership and effective party control would continue 
to intimidate our solons-and also our executive. But 
President versus Congress on foreign policy would 
present issues to the country. One-third of the Senate 
versus the President clouds issues. 
Difficulties have arisen from the fact that, during 
recent years those responsible for the initial formula-
tion of our foreign policy and for explaining that for-
mulation to the legislature and to the public have 
seemed to be confused in the,ir own minds and have 
spoken "\\'ith divided voices.2 They may reply, to be 
sure, that they fear to be too explicit because they 
thereby invite congressional criticism and antagonism. 
That explains but does not excuse their conduct. For 
example (Time, January 30) Secretary Hull rather 
1 I never use this word without recalling some magnificent lines in Frank 
Sullivan's Christmas greetings in the New Yorker (December 1939): 
"To every moral eunuch 
Who had a hand in the Pact of Munich, 
The rhyme is bad but the Pact was worse 
What was Neville's plane will be Europe's hearse." 
2 Some years ago a group of British Liberals, in a statement of policies 
they would like to see pursued-a statement which was remarkable because 
it was agreed to rather than because of its substance-referred to the diffi-
culties arising "from the fact that, owing to the American Constitution and 
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vehemently denied that there had been any reticence 
in respect of what the State Department knew about 
the intentions of Hitler and particularly of the Japanese 
war lords. Those intentions, he said, were all spelled out 
in the report which the State Department issued some 
months ago called "War and Peace". The i's were 
dotted and the t's crossed in the supporting volume of 
documents which was published later. 
True it is that those who paid some attention to the 
sweep of affairs, who had had some experience in inter-
preting newspaper dispatches and the urbane under-
statements of diplomats, "will be forced to view with 
alarm, etc., etc.", knew that the Far Eastern situation 
was steadily worsening. The plain fact, however, is 
that no one in a high place ever told Congress or the 
American people in plain. terms what Ambassador 
Grew is now effectively telling the people he had 
reported to the State Department and what the 
"War and Peace" volume shows that the State Depart-
ment knew long before Pearl Harbor. There was no 
real reporting to Congress or to the nation. 
The Department of State is the only one of the 
executive departments which does not send an annual 
report to Congress. If as Chief of Staff General 
Marshall can present to Congress a statesmanlike 
document which deals rather frankly with strategy, 
materiel, I see no reason why the Department of State 
could not present a comparable report. What educa-
tion of the country there is derives from speeches or 
press conferences, and here the voices are not infre-
quently discordant. The counsellors are multitudi-
nous and the people cannot detect which wisdom it is 
American traditions, the foreign policy of the United States is less predictable 
than that of other countries. In America, the agreements which the State 
Department negotiates with other countries have to be based to an exceptional 
degree upon principles firmly rooted in American public opinion; and other 
counties must recognize that the arrangements that they may make with 
the United States cannot be relied upon to stand in face of a substantial 
change in American public opinion. Thus the predictability of American 
foreign policy has perforce to be based not wholly, or even mainly, upon 
binding treaty engagements, but rather upon the enunciation, and the evident 
acceptance by public opinion, of certain cardinal principles of policy." The 
Next Five YeaTS (1935), pp. 239-240. 
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that they should make their own. There was truth as 
well as cynicism in the remark that Lord Melbourne is 
supposed to have made after a Cabinet meeting: "Did 
we act in order to raise the price of corn, or to lower it? 
It does not matter what we say so long as we all say 
the same thing." There are other considerations, some 
minor, some major. Save when Mr. Bryan was Sec-
retary of State, there has not been much attempt to 
work with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Moreover, the State Department lives in a dark 
shadow oast by lawyers. Save, I think, in one or two 
cases, the Secretaries have always been of the pro-
fession which, in Burke's phrase, may quicken the 
intellect but which, save in those happily born, will 
not invigorate the understanding. Elihu Root and 
Mr. Hull have been exceptions. They can keep them-
selves from thinking like lawyers. 
v. 
To remove the difficulties which I have been con-
sidering would not require constitutional change. They 
are matters of administrative habits and political 
custom and there is no reason why in respect of them 
there could not be substantial and early improvement. 
But the constitutional difficulty would still remain. 
Proposals have recently been made in many quarters 
for a constitutional amendment which would assimilate 
treaties to ordinary legislation and make it impossible 
for the kickers-that is, for one more than on~-third of 
the Senate-to have the final say. Such a proposal 
seems to me quite impractical. Save as the result of 
an unmistakable and long-continued insistence by the 
country, the Senate could not be expected to join in the 
submission of such a constitutional amendment to the 
states for ratification. It is improbable, almost im-
possible, that a constitutional amendment could be 
ratified in time to permit the Congress rather than the 
Senate to approve the post-war settlements. Agitation 
over such an amendment would be dangerous. Ratifi-
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cation by three-quarters of the Conventions in the 
states or by three-quarters of the legislatures might be 
possible but it would be opposed by the anti-British, 
anti-Russian elements, by narrow nationalists who 
would feel that they would have less hope of getting 
their views to prevail through a congressional majority 
than they now have through one more than one-third 
of the Senate. They would cry, "God save the fair 
fabric of our constitution from mutilation" when what 
they really meant was that they wished to retain a 
constitutional arrangement which would permit them, 
a minority, to have their way. Their intellectually 
dishonest opposition would get support from the inertia 
which works against any institutional change. Mean-
while the Senate would accept the implicit invitation 
to insist on the full use of all its prerogatives until by 
the amending authority those special prerogatives had 
been taken away. 
Hence it seems to me that the sensible-indeed the 
only practicable- procedure is to put the treaty-
making authority on the shelf and for the President to 
enter into international undertakings through execu-
tive agreements discussed in advance, so far as is 
possible, with the House and Senate committees and 
ratified by joint resolutions of Congress. For this 
there are many precedents, which have been much 
discussed. 1 
If, after the Senate, because of the two-thirds rule, 
refused to advise and consent to the ratification of 
proposed treaties, Congress could by joint resolutions 
admit Texas to the Union, annex Hawaii and conclude 
peace with Germany, what subject of international 
agreement can be conceived inappropriate for Presiden-
tial-Congressional approval? The transfer of fifty 
destroyers for leases of British bases near the United 
States was negotiated by the President and legislative 
approval came when Congress appropriated for the 
construction of installations in the islands. We have 
1 Wallace McClure: International Executive Agreements. Democratic Pro-
cedure under the C0n8titution of the United States (1941). 
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in effect a continuing defensive alliance with Great 
Britain which is not in the form of a treaty but which 
for that reason is no less binding. The President sent 
the Lend-Lease Bill to Congress and its enactment 
into law gave the Executive authority to negotiate 
mutual aid agreements which are binding without 
Senatorial approval. The agreements setting up the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration were drafted in consultation with certain mem-
bers of the Senate and the House, were deliberately 
withdrawn from the treaty-making authority, and 
were approved by Congress. The country and Con-
gress realized that they were necessary. Why let a 
few Senators who spoke only for themselves each cast 
two votes against the agreements? Who indeed would 
say that anyone of the measures I have enumerated 
- could have been put in the form of a treaty without 
causing a long and painful fight in the Senate with 
perhaps mutilation the price that would have to be 
paid to buy off the one more than one-third. 
The complete abandonment of treaty-making in the 
technical sense would not be anti-democratic, anti-
constitutional, or even extra-constitutional. Of course 
it will be said that putting the treaty provisions on the 
whelf would do violence to the literary theory of the 
. Constitution. But constitutional and political morality 
are more important than literary theory. What con-
stitutional morality really means was well expressed 
by the historian Grote when he was discussing the 
working of Athenian democracy in the time of 
Kleisthenes. It meant "the perfect confidence in the 
bosom of every citizen amidst the bitterness of party 
contest that the spirit of the constitution will be no 
less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own" . 
Quadrennially, we witness in the United States a 
perfect expression of such constitutional morality: 
when we elect a President. Anyone who worries about 
the literary theory of the Constitution and who chal-
lenges the approval of internat~onal agreements by a 
majority of Congress rather than by two-thirds of the 
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Senate should go on to argue that the 1944 Electoral 
College should disregard the popular vote and exercise 
a free choice of the President of the United States. 
There was no constitutional amendment imposing on 
the Electoral College the requirement that it be a 
rubber-stamp. Even though the framers intended the 
Electoral College to be an efficient mechanism and to 
avoid the choice of the President by popular vote, 
agreement and custom, now long unchallengeable, have 
worked the change. We could deal in the same way 
with the treaty-making authority. 
As is so frequently the case in problems of govern-
ment-in what the late Mr. F. S. Oliver called "The 
Endless Adventure" -forms are less important than 
spirit and substance. This was well put by de Tocque-
ville when he addressed the French Chamber just 
before the overthrow of Louis Phillippe: 
"It is not the mechanism of the laws," he 
declared, "that produces great events but the 
inner spirit of government. Keep the laws as 
they are if you wish. I think you would be 
wrong to do so; but keep them. Keep the 
men too if it gives you any pleasure . . . but 
in God's name change the spirit of your gov-
ernment for, I repeat, that spirit will lead you 
directly to the abyss." 
NOTE.-Other undertakings and absence from the country have delayed 
me in preparing this lecture for publication. Although, in the meantime, 
much water has flowed under the bridge which was my text, I have resisted 
the temptation to make an extensive revision, and the words which have 
been read (or not read) are substantially those that were spoken on February 
8th. Since then two books have appeared which support the position I 
took: Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and World Organization, and 
Kenneth Colegrove, The American Senate and World Peace. 
I should add, however, that the 1944 Republican Platform, after favoring 
"responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative 
organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and 
to attain permanent peace", declares that: 
" ... any treatment or agreement to attain such aims ... 
shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate' 
of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present 
concur." 
If this pledge should receive more honour than planks in party platforms 
usually receive, the country might just as well make up its mind that the 
continuation of policy by means other than war will not be successful. 
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APPENDIX 
Most observers of the Washington scene have had 
the impression that the administrative organization to 
deal with international economic operations and prob-
lems has not been clear cut and unconfused. When 
the detailed schedule of starts and halts, of trials and 
errors, of reorganization and streamlining is examined, 
the wonder grows that the confusion has not been 
much worse. 
In its issue for 5 February 1944 the Department of 
State Bulletin reviewed the earlier development of 
organizations to deal with economic operations--a 
chronology which came down to the end of 1943, when 
the Department reorganized itself and established 
twelve major "line" offices. Two of the new offices-
the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs and the Office 
of Economic Affairs-"were created to initiate and 
coordinate policy and action, so far as the Department 
of State is concerned, in all matters pertaining to the 
economic relations of the United States with other 
governments" . 
During the previous four and one-half years there 
had been many committees, commissions, corpora-
tions, bureaux and offices. The Foreign Agricultural 
Service and the Foreign Commerce Service had been 
transferred to the Department of State on 1 July 1939. 
On 3 October of that year an Inter-American Financial 
and Economic Advisory Committee had been set up. 
Two months later there came into being an Inter-
departmental Committee for the Coordination of Foreign 
and Domestic Military Purchases. On 26 February 
1940 the Department of State established a Division 
of Commercial Affairs. In May the Office for Emergency 
Management was created. June saw the birth of an 
Inter-American Development Commission, Rubber Re-
serve Company, Metals Reserve Company and Division 
of Commercial Treaties and Agreements. In July an 
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Office of the Administrator of Export Control was 
established. Fourteen months later its responsibili-
ties and duties were transferred to the Economic De-
fense Board. In August 1940 the Council of National 
Defense, with the approval of the President, created an 
Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Re-
lations Between the American Republics, and the Presi-
dent and the Canadian Prime Minister set up a Per-
manent Joint Board on Defense, United States and 
Canada, "to consider in the broad sense the defense 
of the north half of the Western Hemisphere". 
There was a lull until January 1941. There then came 
into being the Office of Production Management; Feb- · 
ruary saw the setting-up of a Committee for Coordina-
tion of Inter-American Shipping; in March Congress 
passed the Lend-Lease Act; and in Mayan Executive 
Order established the Division of Defense Aid Reports in 
the Office for Emergency Management to provide "a 
channel for clearance of transactions and reports and 
to coordinate the processing of requests for aid under 
the Lend-Lease Act". Six months later this Division of 
Defense Aid Reports was abolished and its functions 
were taken over by the Office of Lend-Lease Adminis-
tration. Meanwhile, during these six months the United 
States and Canada established a Material Coordinating 
Committee and Joint Economic Committees. In July the 
President vested in the Secretary of State, in collabora-
tion with the Secretary of the Treasury, the AttorIl:ey 
General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 
of Export Control and the Coordinator of Commercial 
and Cultural Relations Between the American Repub-
lics, the authority to issue and maintain lists of names 
of persons and firms who because of pro-Axis ties, 
would be denied the right to trade with residents of the 
United States. The Department of State established 
a Division of World Trade Intelligence on 21 July, and 
on 30 July an Executive Order created the Office of 
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and estab-
lished in it a Committee on Inter-American Affairs. On 
the same day the President set up an Economic Defense 
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Board, which six months later became the Board of 
Economic Warfare. In July 1943 this latter agency 
was abolished. Its functions were transferred to the 
Office of Economic Warfare, which two months later 
was itself transferred to the Foreign Economic Admin-
istration. 
The Office for Emergency Management acquired in 
August 1941 a Supply Priorities and Allocations Board. 
In October the Department of State set up a Board of 
Economic Operations and a Division of Commercial 
Policy and Agreements, which latter absorbed the 
Division of Commercial Treaties and Agreements, created 
in July 1940. As part of the same organization the 
Department of State set up a Division of Exports and 
Defense Aid, which was abolished in June, 1942; a 
Division of Defense Materials, which was abolished in 
August 1942; a Division of Studies and Statistics, 
which was abolished in June 1942; and a Foreign Funds 
and Financial Division, which was abolished in August 
1943. 
A special Caribbean Office came into being in October 
1941. 
In November 1941 the Canadian-American Joint 
Defense Production Committee became the J oint War 
Production Committee, United States and Canada. The 
Department of State established a Financial Division 
and Foreign Funds Control Division in November 1941. 
In January 1942 the President abolished the Office 
. of Production Management and transferred its powers 
to the War Production Board. He and Prime Minister 
Churchill set up a Combined Raw Materials Board, a 
Munitions Assignments Board and a Combined Ship-
ping Adjustment Board. The American section of this 
ShipP!ng Board was to be in the Office for Emergency 
Management as a War Shipping Administration. 
In February 1942 the State Department created an 
American Hemisphere Exports Office. In March the 
Anglo-American Caribbean Commission came into exist-
ence. June saw the birth of a Combined Food Board 
and a Combined Production and Resources Board. July 
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marked the beginning of institutional interest in relief. 
First, there was the War Relief Control Board and in 
November the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilita-
tion Operations. In November also the Department of 
State established an Office of Foreign Territories to have 
"responsibility for dealing with all non-military matters 
arising as a result of the military occupation of terri-
tories in Europe and North Africa by the armed forces 
of the United Nations and affecting the interests of the 
United States". Seven months later this was abol-
ished. 
In January 1943 the Division of Economic Studies 
was established. In February 1943 the Department of 
State set up a Division of Exports and Requirements 
and abolished its American Hemisphere Exports Office. 
In April the Treasury made public a provisional out-
line of a plan for post-war international monetary 
stabilization (Post-War I nternational Monetary Stabili-
zation Plan); in May the United Nations Conference 
on Food and Agriculture met in Hot Springs. In the 
same month there was a meeting of the M exican-
United States Commission of Experts To Formulate a 
Program for Economic Cooperation Between the Two 
Governments, and the Office of War Mobilization was 
set up. In June the President sent the Secretary of 
State a Plan for Coordinating the Economic Activities 
of United States Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas. 
Also in June the Department of State set up an o.ffice 
of Foreign Economic Coordination and abolished its 
Office of Foreign Territories and its Board of Economic 
Operations. In July an Executive Order created an 
Office of Economic Warfare, to which was transferred 
all powers and duties of the Board of Economic War-
fare and all subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation engaged in financing foreign purchases 
and imports. This Office lived only two months and 
was transferred to the Foreign Economic A.dministra-
tion on 25 September. In August the War Commodities 
Division and the Blockade and Supply Division came 
into existence in the Office of Foreign Economic Coordi-
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nation of the Department of State, and the Foreign 
Funds Control Division and the Division of Defense 
Materials were abolished. As has been said, 25 Sep-
tember saw the creation of the Foreign Economic 
A dministration ill the Office for Emergency Management. 
It was to centralize the activities formerly carried on 
by the Offices of Lend-Lease . Administration, Foreign 
Relief an{l Rehabilitation Operations, Economic War-
fare, and Foreign Economic Coordination. The Depart-
ment of State on 6 November abolished its Office of 
Foreign Economic Coordination and appointed four 
groups of advisers to be "concerned, respectively, with 
the foreign policy aspects of matters relating to the 
allocation of supplies, of wartime economic activities 
in liberated areas, of wartime economic activities in 
eastern hemisphere countries other than liberated 
areas, and of wartime economic activities in the other 
American republics" . On 9 November came the 
Signature of Agree·rnent for United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration. 
t 31 J. 
